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Abstract: With increasing variety and sophistication of computer-based medical devices, and more diverse users and 
use environments, usability is essential, especially to ensure safety. Usability standards and guidelines play 
an important role. We reviewed several, focusing on the IEC 62366 and 60601 sets. It is plausible that these 
standards have reduced risks for patients, but we raise concerns regarding: (1) complex design trade-offs that 
are not addressed, (2) a focus on user interface design (e.g., making alarms audible) to the detriment of other 
human factors (e.g., ensuring users actually act upon alarms they hear), and (3) some definitions and scope 
restrictions that may create “blind spots”. We highlight potential related risks, e.g. that clear directives on 
“easier to understand” risks, though useful, may preclude mitigating other, more “difficult” ones; but ask to 
what extent these negative effects can be avoided by standard writers, given objective constraints. Our critique 
is motivated by current research and incident reports, and considers standards from other domains and 
countries. It is meant to highlight problems, relevant to designers, standards committees, and human factors 
researchers, and to trigger discussion about the potential and limits of standards.   
1 INTRODUCTION 
Glucose meters, infusion pumps, and radiation 
therapy systems are a few of the many computer-
based medical devices becoming increasingly 
essential in medical practice. These devices are 
evolving from simple, one-function designs to 
sophisticated, multi-function abilities; their range of 
users is expanding to less skilled users (including 
patients); and smaller, more portable devices are 
introducing a variety of new use environments.  
In the Aggregated Quality Assurance for Systems 
(AQUAS) project, which addresses engineering 
challenges arising from the inter-dependence 
between system safety, security and performance, one 
use case concerns extensions to a blood pressure and 
neuromuscular transmission monitoring device to 
provide closed-loop control of these physiological 
parameters via an infusion pump. We were tasked to 
explore some human factor issues in the switch from 
human to automated control.  Of specific interest 
were “exceptions” – situations involving extra user 
interventions: for instance, scenarios in which a 
device fails to perform as specified, or reverts to a 
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fallback mode of operation in response to detecting 
failures, and/or an alarm requires intervention by a 
clinician, and/or a clinician overrides a device 
(rightly: e.g. due to a failure, or wrongly: e.g., a user 
that mistrusts a device overrides some of its correct 
decisions). This focus was linked to our own previous 
research, about effects of warnings and so-called 
“automation bias” (Alberdi, 2009; Povyakalo, 2013); 
many of our examples will be in these areas, but some 
observations are of more general relevance. 
Our example in the abstract, that for an alarm to 
be effective the designer has a responsibility not only 
to ensure that it is audible, but that the overall device 
design does not make it likely to be ignored, is but 
one of a class of problems arising from the complex 
interactions between the user, the device and the use 
environment. These issues are known, to extents that 
vary from references in the popular press to e.g. “cry-
wolf” events (users failing to intervene when they 
should, because a high rate of false alarms “trained” 
them to ignore alarms), to scientific literature about 
“automation bias” (certain human errors becoming 
more likely, or new errors being created, by use of 
automated devices), “situation awareness”, 
“complacency” (user inaction when they should 
intervene, attributed to users delegating to the 
automated alarms their responsibility to monitor for 
dangers), etc. A review of medical devices, 
considering a subset of such phenomena, suggested 
they affected as much as 6-11% of user decisions 
(Goddard, 2014). These problems are due not only to 
user interface design, but also to factors such as 
accuracy of algorithms, user adaptation to the device, 
etc. They are also not limited to alarm-emitting 
devices but to a range of decision-support devices 
providing prompts, warnings, advice, etc.; e.g., in 
interpreting ECGs (Tsai, 2003) and screening 
mammograms (Povyakalo, 2013).   
Our work in AQUAS started with studying how  
“exceptions” and security/safety/performance 
interactions are covered in a set of human factors 
standards that govern medical devices in the 
European market: IEC 62366-1:2015 (Application of 
Usability Engineering to Medical Devices) and 
guidance on its application: IEC 62366-2:2016; IEC 
60601-1-6:2010 (General Requirements for Basic 
Safety and Essential Performance - Collateral 
Standard: Usability), and IEC 60601-1-8:2007 
(Collateral Standard: General requirements, tests and 
guidance for alarm systems in medical electrical 
equipment and medical electrical systems). For 
brevity, we refer to these as “European medical 
usability standards” or EMUSs. 
Usability standards have important roles. They 
expose designers to concerns and design principles 
produced by the specialist human factors (HF) 
community, particularly important for safety. It 
seems plausible that these standards have reduced risk 
for patients. However, our reading raised concerns, 
broader than our initial focus implied, about whether 
EMUSs may fail to deliver some benefits.  The 
following three sections detail concerns about: 
complex design trade-offs arising within usability and 
between usability and other system attributes; a focus 
on user interface design risking relative neglect of 
other causes of use errors; and some definitions of 
terms and of the scope of the EMUSs that may create 
“blind spots”. Last, we discuss challenges in dealing 
with these concerns.  
2 THE ISSUE OF TRADE-OFFS 
The writers of EMUSs appear concerned with the 
need to ‘sell’ usability to designers, by explaining its 
many advantages (e.g. Section 5.2 of IEC 62366-2). 
This is in line with frequent concerns in human 
factors circles that technically trained designers may 
regard usability as not needing special attention. But 
this presentation may end up depicting usability as a 
unidimensional quality, with compliance to 
prescriptions being a win-win option, without 
concern for possible needs for trade-offs. For 
example, an important concern about exceptions is 
the rate of false positive alarms, which can lead to 
inappropriate user action. IEC 60601-1-8 states 
“algorithms that determine alarm conditions should 
be carefully optimized to provide, on balance, an 
overall benefit to patient care” and “should be 
designed to minimize the number of false negative 
and false positive alarm conditions.”  This latter 
statement seems to mask: the necessary trade-offs 
between rates of false positive and false negative 
errors; experience that designers can make alarms 
more sensitive, only to find user decisions become 
less sensitive; and evidence that the best 
sensitivity/specificity combination may vary between 
users, suggesting that user-adjustable thresholds may 
be advantageous, within constraints. We note that 
elsewhere (Section 15.2.5 of the American HE75 
standard) false alarms are addressed with a more 
balanced approach, which discusses such trade-offs. 
It seems dangerous that standards may be read as 
reducing usability engineering to a set of design 
precautions that will improve design from all 
viewpoints. For instance, about different aspects of 
usability itself, sometimes improving usability for 
certain operations may only be achieved by reducing 
it for others; e.g., putting obstacles in the way of 
access to functions that change the settings of a device 
may be required, for safety, so that more frequently 
used features can be used quickly without 
accidentally changing the settings. 
The EMUSs do highlight some design trade-offs 
in the interaction between usability and other system 
attributes, such as safety or performance. A good 
example (Section 5.1 of IEC 62366-2) is how design 
for high performance in user tasks might make a 
device safer, as it speeds up urgent therapy, but also 
introduce hazards, if critical confirmation steps are 
omitted. On the other hand, slow task performance 
could “lead a well-meaning user to pass over steps in 
a procedure to increase speed of the procedure.  This 
can result in a higher probability of use error linked 
to a potentially unacceptable risk” (IEC 62366-2).  
Emphasizing such relationships is important 
because usability standards may be intended “to 
provide a single easy-to-use source of human factors 
design criteria” (Ahlstrom, 2008), separate from other 
standards on, for example, safety or security; 
however, considering each attribute in isolation can 
lead, among other issues, to unidentified hazards.  
The role of usability towards device safety, 
mentioned for example in Section 5.1 of IEC 62366-
2, seems especially important to stress since “the 
majority of medical device incident reports can 
primarily be attributed to use error” (van der Peijl, 
2012) but some designers may consider usability as a 
secondary, almost cosmetic attribute: e.g. “keeping 
users happy with a user interface”, much less critical 
than e.g. “ensuring a pump delivers the correct dose”. 
However, as an example, displaying dose limits on a 
user interface not only “reduce[s] the burden on 
users’ memory and increase[s] their confidence when 
programming the pump”, but can also prevent a 
harmful dose (IEC 62366-2).   
EMUSs do not yet address the relationship 
between usability and security, which presents a good 
example of necessary trade-offs. Security has 
attracted attention because the trend towards greater 
integration and connectivity between medical devices 
and networks brings benefits, but also security 
challenges about patient safety and confidentiality. A 
recent report (Francis, 2017) documents medical 
devices being targeted by cybercriminals, and that 
these attacks are rising. For example, blood gas 
analyzers and radiology equipment were found to 
offer backdoors into hospital networks allowing 
attackers to send patient records to unknown locations 
abroad.   
HF issues with a need for trade-offs arise in user 
authentication. Authentication may be needed to 
prevent malicious use of a medical device (FDA, 
2018). But requiring user authentication may be a 
nuisance for users, especially if required often; may 
delay necessary work, and, in emergencies, inhibit a 
user’s ability to respond in a timely manner, thus 
posing a safety hazard. User authentication in a 
medical device is a good example of a many-way 
trade-off that cannot be solved by focusing on a single 
system attribute; a designer must consider the 
interaction between safety, security, performance, 
and usability.    
Even for the purpose of security alone, trade-offs 
arise in that stringent security policies can be self-
defeating if they reduce usability: they encourage 
users to circumvent them. For example, users 
required to memorise many complex passwords often 
respond by sharing passwords, posting them on paper 
notes, etc. (Zhang-Kennedy, 2016).  These reactions 
have prompted the U.S. National Institute of 
Standards and Technology to reverse parts of their 
previous advice on password policies (Grassi, 2017). 
In conclusion, we suggest that usability be 
presented as a multi-dimensional attribute, requiring 
a balanced understanding of the various trade-offs 
between effects of a design decision on multiple 
aspects, both within usability and between usability 
and other attributes including security.   
3 CAUSES OF USE ERRORS AND 
RISK OF TUNNEL VISION 
An important, recurring term in the EMUSs is use 
error, defined as “user action or lack of user action 
while using the medical device that leads to a 
different result than that intended by the manufacturer 
or expected by the user” (IEC 62366-1). The term use 
error is chosen over user error or human error to 
educate designers to accept responsibility for 
usability rather than blaming users: “although human 
beings are imperfect, it is inappropriate to blame the 
user when problems occur” (IEC 62366-2). 
Removing any “blame the user” attitudes seems 
indeed important for good design. But current 
explanations seem to shift the blame from users to 
user interface (UI) designers: this too may cause blind 
spots in designers’ vision. UI design is mentioned 
frequently both as cause of use errors – “much more 
commonly, use errors are the direct result of poor user 
interface design” (IEC 62366-1), “user interface 
design shortcomings can lead to use errors” (IEC 
62366-2) – and as the solution: “usability engineering 
is a principle means to reduce [...] risk and improve 
patient care by reducing the potential for harmful use 
error through enlightened user interface design” (IEC 
62366-2). Usability itself is defined as a 
“characteristic of the user interface” (IEC 62366-1). 
We are concerned that focusing readers’ attention on 
user interfaces may come at the cost of neglecting 
other, often harder to mitigate and/or more dangerous, 
problems in human factors, which we discuss next.     
3.1 Beyond User Interface Design 
Research and incident reports indicate that thorough 
identification of use errors must consider: (1) the 
users (e.g. experience, functional state, biases 
towards automation), (2) the use environment (e.g. 
policies, time constraints, noise), (3) the device 
design (e.g., user interface, device reliability, level of 
automation) and (4) the complex interactions between 
these three components (e.g. automation bias, user 
adaptation, complacency). User interface design is 
but one player in a web of potential causes of use 
error. The EMUSs do mention some non-user 
interface related causes of use errors (e.g., Section 
6.5.1 and Annex H in IEC 62366-2), but our concern 
is that the focus on user interface as both a cause of, 
and remedy for, use errors, and the relative ease of 
prescriptive solutions about it (e.g., display colours, 
pitch of auditory alarms) may divert designers’ 
attention from warnings about non-user interface 
related causes, generally not accompanied by 
prescriptions. We discuss examples related to 
exceptions, close to our own expertise, without any 
claim to exhausting the range of problems of interest. 
As an illustration of the complex interaction of 
various factors to trigger a use error, consider a 
scenario where a patient parameter, monitored by a 
medical device, reaches a dangerously low level that 
warrants immediate user action. To start with, user 
action is likely influenced by whether the device 
algorithm is designed to detect this danger with high 
enough probability. If the device does detect this 
danger, the alarm signal needs to be effectively 
communicated. However, to prevent a hazardous 
situation, it also matters whether, in practice, the 
alarm leads to correct user action, with high enough 
probability. This may depend on environmental 
factors such as whether the user is busy dealing with 
other, simultaneous tasks.  It is also influenced by 
user-related factors such as users’ mental models of 
how the device works (IEC 60601-1-10).  In turn, 
mental models are based on users’ knowledge and 
thus depend not only on training but also on users’ 
previous experience of interaction with the device.   
There may well be a need for standards to 
emphasise the role of sound user interface design, to 
ensure that designers take certain precautions. But 
Table 1: Various causes of specific use errors beyond shortcomings in user interface design 
All quoted text is from Section 16.3 in IEC 62366-2. 
Use Error User Interface (UI) 
Design Shortcomings 
Other Possible Causes 
Not Related to UI Design 
Potential Mitigations Addressing the 
Other Possible Causes 
“Users fail to 
detect a dangerous 
increase in heart 
rate because alarm 
limit is set too high 
and users do not 
look at medical 
device display 
because they are 
over-reliant on the 
alarm system” 
 
“User-adjusted high 
and low alarm limits 
on a heart-rate monitor 
are not continuously 
displayed” 
(implicit solution: 
continuously display 
alarm limits) 
User chose inappropriate 
alarm limits either due to 
inexperience or in an 
effort to reduce the device 
alarm rate which they find 
distracting  
- Consider how the alarm threshold 
(sensitivity/specificity combination) is set 
– not just choosing a more/less sensitive 
threshold, but also considering default 
settings, degrees of freedom by users, and 
customization according to certain 
attributes such as user ability. 
“User ignored a 
warning label 
telling the user to 
disconnect the 
patient tube before 
turning the medical 
device off” 
“The medical device 
did not require the user 
to confirm patient 
disconnection before 
powering-off” 
(implicit solution: add 
a verification step to 
confirm patient 
disconnection before 
powering off is 
allowed) 
User, at the end of a long 
medical procedure, is 
fatigued and overlooks the 
importance of this step.  
Or other devices, to which 
the user is accustomed, 
dictate that equipment 
must be turned off before 
disconnecting from the 
patient. 
 
- Add a verification step to confirm 
patient disconnection before powering off 
is allowed.   
- Redesign the device so that the order of 
these operations does not matter. 
“User disregarded 
a warning symbol 
and allowed a 
portable medical 
device to run out 
of battery power” 
“The warning symbol 
was not sufficiently 
attention-getting” 
(implicit solution: 
make the warning 
symbol more 
visible/audible to 
attract the user’s 
attention) 
Lack of reaction to an 
alarm due to factors such 
as “cry wolf”.  In other 
words, it may not be that a 
user did not see/hear the 
warning, but that their 
experience with the 
device has led them to 
ignore it. 
 
- Ensure that the time between when an 
alarm is emitted and when the actual 
danger occurs is so chosen as not to cause 
users to ignore alarms/delay action, yet 
gives them enough time to react.  
- During user training, raise awareness 
against behaviours such as “cry wolf”.   
- Consider potential unwanted interactions 
between different alarms, and how to 
group/prioritise alarms to reduce them.  
 
designers who focus solely on the role of user 
interface are likely to overlook other causes of 
hazards, and thus fail to address them properly.   
Table 1 helps illustrate the danger of such tunnel 
vision.  The first two columns describe specific use 
errors and user interface design shortcomings that 
may cause them. They are taken from IEC 62366-2, 
with our comments added in italics.  We add the third 
column to illustrate other plausible, non-user 
interface causes of those errors, and the fourth column 
for possible remedies against these latter causes. 
Table 1 is not meant to deny the role of effective user 
interface design, but to help shift the focus, using 
concrete examples, emphasizing that: 
 some use errors can result from non-UI causes, 
 although some of these other causes can be 
remedied by the same design mitigations that 
address interface design shortcomings (e.g., 
Row 2), some require different remedies (e.g., 
Rows 1 and 3).  In fact, in Row 3, making the 
warning symbol more attention-getting not only 
does not address the “cry wolf” phenomena, but 
may even exacerbate it.   
 mitigation strategies may extend beyond 
changes to the user interface and instead address 
the user or environment (e.g., Rows 1 and 3). 
3.2 Potential Mitigation Strategies 
It is useful for standards to mention difficult human 
factors issues, but equally important is discussing 
how they may be mitigated.  Such mitigations may 
address: (1) user characteristics (e.g., via effective 
training), (2) device properties (e.g., manipulating the 
level of automation, adjusting alarms to focus on 
hazards that are difficult for unaided users to detect – 
i.e., increasing diversity between the device and the 
user), and (3) environmental factors (e.g., more 
effective policies on device use such as detailing how 
best to integrate a device into a user’s workflow).   
Importantly, when considering mitigation 
strategies, designers will need to consider the effect 
of human adaptation to automation– a critical issue 
that seems to be left implicit in these standards. The 
presence of automation makes people adapt their 
working procedures and cognitive processes 
(consciously or not) in ways that may, at times, 
negatively affect their performance. For instance, a 
very reliable alarm system may cause users to adapt 
to completely rely on it to detect dangers, which could 
result in users failing to react to dangers not alerted 
by the device – even dangers that they would have 
tackled properly without the alarm system 
(Povyakalo, 2013). We note that many adaptations, 
even when unintentional, can be defended as 
“rational” in that they improve some aspect of 
performance, e.g. time or resources. Yet, they may 
also increase the risk from use error, even compared 
to the unaided user, at least for some category of 
situations (the device, while possibly reducing overall 
risk, could transfer risks between kinds of situations, 
and possibly kinds of patients) (Povyakalo, 2013). 
Testing that only incorporates a single, often first-
time, use is unlikely to reveal dangerous effects such 
as complacency, overreliance, automation bias, etc.; 
instead, these may only become apparent in post-
production testing and evaluation of device logs. We 
suggest that it would be advantageous to encourage 
such focused post-production evaluation/testing.      
To illustrate the significance of human adaptation 
on user decisions, consider a clinician’s mental model 
of a computer-aided detection (CAD) device for 
cancer.  Understanding mental models is important in 
addressing use errors (e.g., dealing with false prompts 
based on a user’s mental model may cause a user to 
miss a true prompt in an area habitually known to 
have false prompts (Alberdi, 2014).  The user may 
start with a sceptical view of the CAD device’s 
capabilities, but after interacting with the device, find 
that it highlights difficult to find masses. This 
interaction shapes the user’s understanding of the 
device’s capabilities and is also likely to increase the 
user’s trust in the device. However, even a single 
error may then reverse this trust (Parasuraman, 2010), 
which can be difficult to regain (Wiegmann 2002).   
The EMUSs state that, “Ideally, an operator’s 
mental model can be easily created through 
interaction with the [device] or it can be acquired 
through explanation from training or the 
accompanying documents” (IEC 60601-1-10). But 
non-ideal situations may exist in which a correct 
mental model is hard to create and maintain. E.g., 
users may easily learn about deterministic functions 
of a device from trial use of it, but be unable to 
conceptualise how likely some very infrequent error 
modes are. The dynamic nature of mental models also 
matters: they may change over time and depend on 
factors such as number and type of error committed 
by the device; it may be useful to alert designers to 
possible discrepancies between users’ mental models 
and the true abilities of devices.  E.g., a study found 
that users’ explanations of how a CAD device 
behaved were based on false notions of its capability 
to detect breast asymmetries (Hartswood, 1997).   
Such complexities may prompt designers to 
choose a “simple” solution: to give users more 
information regarding a device’s capabilities and 
algorithms. The difficult question is: exactly how 
much information? The standards suggest, in a 
similar manner to win-win examples presented in 
Section 2, that “reporting the false positive and false 
negative alarm condition accuracy in a standardized 
format allows operators and responsible 
organizations to understand the performance of 
equipment” (IEC 60601-1-8). But, by the same token, 
informing users of these rates can paradoxically lead 
to probability matching (users agreeing with the 
device at a rate equal to the device’s reliability), 
which can result in decreased overall performance 
(Wiegmann, 2002).  Furthermore, good explanations 
of device behaviour can make inaccurate device 
advice more convincing and thus increase the chance 
of automation bias.  Providing too much information 
can also lead to unnecessary complexity and 
jeopardize users’ acceptance of device advice 
(Alberdi, 2014). In conclusion, dealing with users’ 
mental models by giving users more information is 
one example of the difficult trade-off decisions 
inherent in the application of most mitigation 
strategies for difficult human factors issues.  
In concluding Section 3, we note that some of 
these difficult HF issues are highlighted in the 
aviation domain. The HF standard approved for use 
by the Federal Aviation Administration states that 
“complacency is a major concern with automation” 
(HF-STD-001B). This standard also has relevant 
references alerting designers to design decisions that 
may promote “complacency and may cause users to 
monitor automation with less vigilance”; although 
focus is mostly on training users “to recognize 
inappropriate uses of an automated device including 
automation bias”, instead of improving by adapting 
the device.   
We note that in a recently proposed amendment to 
IEC 60601-1-8 (not yet to be regarded as a standard, 
but released for public feedback until January 2019), 
new terms, such as “alarm fatigue”, “alarm flood”, 
and “nuisance alarm signal”, have been added to 
address some of these difficult concepts. We 
welcome these recent additions, but reason that to 
help designers appreciate the true danger of these 
issues, the definitions need to be accompanied with 
examples, explanations and potential mitigations. 
4 DEFINITIONS, SCOPE AND 
RISK OF BLIND SPOTS  
Standards try to define precisely concepts they use 
and the scope of each rule. But precise definitions 
may do harm if they are inappropriate or inconsistent. 
We found examples of definitions that, while they 
may cause no confusion for an experienced designer 
in a safety-aware company, are otherwise liable to 
cause similar dangers to those discussed earlier: 
missed or mis-prioritized hazards. 
4.1 Conceptual Gaps from Definitions 
Alarm condition is defined as: “state of the alarm 
system when it has determined that a potential or 
actual hazardous situation exists for which operator 
awareness or response is required” (IEC 60601-1-8).  
As noted directly after the definition, this suggests 
that an alarm condition can be invalid (a false 
positive).  However, another note states that an alarm 
condition may also be missed (a false negative).  But 
the definition implies that if the alarm system has not 
detected the hazardous situation then the situation is 
not an alarm condition. There is a logical 
inconsistency. One could think that false negatives 
can at least be attributed to an alarm signal; but this 
is defined as “type of signal generated by the alarm 
system to indicate the presence (or occurrence) of an 
alarm condition”, thus excluding false negatives, 
when an alarm signal is absent despite there being a 
hazard. This could reduce attention to problems like 
mode confusion due to lack of a clear alert that a 
device entered fallback mode (IEC 60601-1-10); an 
error type known to cause accidents.  
To be sure, alarm system is defined as “parts of 
[..] a medical electrical system that detect alarm 
conditions and, as appropriate, generate alarm 
signals”: the intended meaning must be that alarm 
conditions exist in a device’s environment, rather 
than inside it as in the definition of alarm condition. 
We note that this inconsistency remains in the current 
draft amendment to IEC 60601-1-8. 
4.2 Scope: What is “Abnormal”? 
EMUSs are written to assess and mitigate risks 
caused by normal use, and to help identify but not 
asses or mitigate risks associated with abnormal use 
(IEC 60601-1-6); “abnormal use” is defined as 
“conscious, intentional act or intentional omission 
[...] that is counter to or violates normal use and is 
also beyond any further reasonable means of user 
interface-related risk control by the manufacturer” 
followed by a note that “an intended but erroneous 
action that is not abnormal use is considered a type of 
use error”.  The standards suggest that abnormal use 
can be distinguished from normal use through a post-
test interview which establishes whether “the user 
understood appropriate use and made a conscious 
decision to act (or not act) in opposition” (IEC 62366-
1). But this criterion may exclude scenarios that we 
(and perhaps the authors of the standard, depending 
on how one reads the complex definition) think 
should be covered by risk mitigation rules.  
For example, consider a device that allows users 
to adjust an alarm threshold for some patient 
parameters. A user that finds the device’s alarms 
dangerously distracting could consciously set wider 
alarm thresholds than ideal for a given patient, to 
reduce the distraction from spurious alarms (IEC 
60601-1-8). Such a conscious (perhaps safety-
motivated) decision is likely a result of design 
choices: perhaps too high a false alarm rate (to 
achieve high sensitivity), or alarms displayed in a 
distracting manner. The user’s conscious, 
inappropriate choice of threshold may cause a 
hazardous situation where a patient whose parameters 
reach a dangerous level goes unnoticed. To 
complicate the scenario, such user behaviour is likely 
to change over time depending on experience with the 
device and factors such as trust in the device. We 
think that controlling such risks should be considered 
in the usability engineering process. Despite the 
“conscious decision to act [...] in opposition”, this 
behaviour is not necessarily “beyond any additional 
means of risk control by the manufacturers”; careful 
consideration of the device’s alarm rate is one way 
manufacturers can address this risk.     
5 DISCUSSION 
In our review of some medical usability standards for 
difficult human factor issues (including issues such as 
automation bias, complacency, human adaptation, 
triggered/unmotivated user interventions, etc.), we 
identified a broader set of concerns than our initial 
focus implied, regarding: the complex design trade-
offs inherent in usability decisions, a focus on UI 
design to the possible detriment of difficult HF issues, 
and finally definitions and scope.  We highlighted 
potential risks but wish here to discuss the possible 
challenges in addressing them.  
Easy to understand and articulate use-related 
hazards are not necessarily the greatest risks, and 
dealing with them should not preclude mitigating 
other, more obscure use-related hazards (HE75). 
Many of our observations above are in the form “this 
‘hard’ topic is not fully addressed” followed by “in 
fairness, these standards refer to the problem in 
various passages, but lack focus or do not give a 
coherent warning or approach”. The “obvious” 
remedy, “give as much concrete advice about these 
issues as about the simpler topics” may however be 
difficult because:  
 Writing and following prescriptions about 
known solutions to well-understood problems is 
easier than prescribing a valid approach to 
complex problems; and there is a lack of 
consensus between researchers about how to 
address many of these difficult HF issues.   
 Providing practical solutions is not trivial (such 
as the dilemma whether to provide users with 
more information regarding device capabilities).  
 Testing for these issues is difficult; it needs to 
incorporate the effect of time on user behaviour, 
often requiring post-production analysis, which 
may be infeasible and/or expensive.     
 Standards need to be simple - many of these 
standards are already over 100 pages, 
contributing to the “usability paradox of 
usability standards” (Ahlstrom, 2008) - but this 
is difficult to achieve without neglecting key 
concepts or masking the true complexity of 
issues, as we exemplified in our discussions.   
We nonetheless offer some ideas of possible 
improvements for discussion. Regarding how “hard” 
issues may be de-emphasised by being only raised in 
terms of somewhat vague warnings, a possible 
improvement could be to have sections individually 
dedicated to them and to proposed solutions, so as to 
add emphasis and make it easier for designers to 
follow a coherent approach to these problems.  
We especially noted some concerns about effects 
of time and human adaptation. Possible 
improvements could be: 
 adding to existing lists of questions that 
designers should ask themselves others like: 
“Does the device design encourage unnecessary 
interventions that may reduce the overall benefit 
of the device and/or increase the probability of 
hazards?”; “Does the device help users in 
situations where help is indeed useful/most 
needed (i.e., is there adequate diversity between 
the device and the user)?”. 
 highlighting the need for post-production 
analysis that focuses on identifying risks 
introduced by evolving user behaviour and 
adaptation to devices.   
The easiest problem to solve seems that of 
inconsistent definitions or vague restricting 
exemptions, although the latter may also be related to 
contentious issues of limits to the responsibility and 
liability of manufacturers. 
As frequent in standards, the scientific 
bibliography is rather old, and not necessarily 
because limited to authoritative or seminal papers. 
This highlights the problem of separation between the 
standard writing process and large sectors of the 
research community that could provide scrutiny of the 
scientific basis of prescriptions, if appropriate reward 
mechanisms could be organised.  
Certainly important to understand is how 
standards shape designers’ decisions, focus their 
attention, and shift their priorities. Sociological 
research seems necessary. This paper is one step 
towards addressing challenging human factors 
concepts in medical standards.   
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